TURTLEDOVE Enhancements with Reduced Networking
- Introduction
- Operating Principles
- Authors
- Stakeholder Feedback / Opposition
- Definitions
- 0. Before Advertising Begins
- 1. On the Advertiser's Site
- a. Faster delivery of ads
- b. Elimination of minimum interest group sizes
- c. Reduced networking
- d. Writing multiple interest groups
- e. Multiple ad formats
- f. Ad categories
- g. SSP tokens
- h. Products
- i. More refined bidding signals and reporting signals
- j. DSPs control bidding
- k. Preserving third-party tag functionality
- 2. In the Background
- 3. Publisher Data
- 4. Browser Signals
- 5. Generating Bids
- 6. The Auction
- 7. Rendering the Ad
- Considered Alternatives
- FAQ
- Summary of needed platform features
- a. Permissioned siloed shareable objects
- b. writeAdvertisementData()
- c. Awareness of interest-based advertisement objects
- d. matchingAdvertisements()
- e. runDecisionLogic()
- f. activateSandbox()
- g. render()
- h. Background ad bundle fetching
- i. Background interest group ad fetching
- j. Background reporting
- k. Verified content rendering
The purpose of this document is to capture a variety of GitHub issues and repos that seek to alter the main TURTLEDOVE proposal. By collating industry experience and feedback into a single document containing a more complete specification, we believe that more productive discussion will ensue, and that these consensus-based enhancements will more easily be applied to the original proposal.
We intend to enhance TURTLEDOVE in the following privacy-preserving ways:
- Clarifying the necessary inputs to participate in an auction
- Clarifying how to deal with multiple ad formats
- Reducing networking overhead by streamlining the data which flows through SSPs
- Eliminating the need for thresholds on interest group sizes
- Reducing the time to potentially deliver an impression
- Better supporting dynamic creative and product recommendation use cases
- Supporting some functionality of third-party tags
- Further specifying auditability of delivered ad creatives
- Enabling brand safety for both advertisers and publishers
- Creating a mechanism for trackability metrics
- Adding a
privateDataobject that can never escape the browser, but improve bidding signals (among potential other use cases) - Specifying a mechanism to support creating interest groups based on publisher browsing behavior
- Allowing publishers to retain control of auction dynamics, while encouraging second-price auctions
- Specifying frequency capping and optimization
- A monosyllabic acronym that is still thematically avian
These ideas are drawn from many authors. Inspiration is taken from discussions in:
- TURTLEDOVE
- TURTLEDOVE Issue #5 - Ad Signals in the auction and group membership
- TURTLEDOVE Issue #36 - Dynamic Creative Use Case
- TURTLEDOVE Issue #37 - Clarification on Entities
- TURTLEDOVE Issue #38 - Contextual Bid
- TURTLEDOVE Issue #46 - Limit on Number of Interest Groups / Web Bundles
- Product-level Turtledove
- Outcome-based Turtledove
- Frequency Capping and Optimization
- PARRROT
- FLoC
- TERN Issue #2 - SSP creative review needs to support per-publisher restrictions
Reading through the original TURTLEDOVE proposal is a prerequisite to understanding this document.
While writing this proposal and thinking through the technical problems herein, we kept three principles in mind:
- Lacking an agreed-upon problem statement, we took it as a constraint that we don't want any third party having access to users' general browsing patterns on the web as a whole.
- Given this constraint, and only this constraint, how can we maximize and retain the functionality that currently exists for the ad tech industry today?
- Since each browser vendor is the ultimate arbiter of what happens in the browser, and this proposal is modeled after TURTLEDOVE, we are trying to stay close to the nature of TURTLEDOVE as originally proposed.
We aim to be accepting to GitHub issues, PRs, or other proposed changes that fall under this set of principles.
If you would like to contribute, please feel free to open a PR. Our preference is to make this a dynamic document to build consensus.
This section summarizes stakeholder sentiment and any feedback; link each to most recent discussion or outcome.
| Stakeholder | Sentiment | Discussion |
|---|---|---|
| NextRoll | In favor | (this document) |
Many of the examples and diagrams in this document presume a world in which DSP, SSP, and publisher entities exist largely as they do now, but the platform features we propose do not specifically require this arrangement. Here are the major entities described in this document:
An entity desiring to advertise some specific product, service, and so on.
A seller of advertising space. May sometimes sell directly to advertisers. Selling is often mediated by a collection of SSPs.
Demand-side platform; a buyer of advertising space. Clients are advertisers. A DSP buys ad space on behalf of its advertiser clients. The buying is often mediated by SSPs.
Supply-side platform; to DSPs, a seller of access to publisher advertising space. To publishers, a seller of access to buyers such as DSPs. Curates both sides of the marketplace and conducts auctions or other business logic to complete transactions.
As in TURTLEDOVE, an owner is responsible for managing interest groups. While it may sometimes
be an individual advertiser, we expect most advertisers will delegate ownership to DSPs.
An owner must provide a .well-known/fetch-ads endpoint as described in c. Fetch ads
request, as well as
bidding logic when participating in publisher/SSP ecosystem auctions (with special platform support
as described below).
In TURTLEDOVE a reader is responsible for answering uncorrelated interest-group requests,
returning an ad and metadata for later use.
In TERN a reader is only able to trigger interest group ad candidate production for each owner
for which it is a reader. Unlike in TURTLEDOVE, a reader in TERN can't directly perceive an
owner's groups (only ads associated with them in an auction), and is not responsible for selecting
ads relevant to an interest group.
Outcome-based Turtledove suggests a mechanism for SSPs to audit ads before they are delivered. While a bit more complex than described here, it essentially boils down to the proposal that an ad must attempt to reach a sufficient number of users before it can be shown. Unfortunately, this will have drastically deleterious effects for smaller advertisers and merchants.
Consider, for example, a local pizza shop attempting to advertise through a platform like Yelp. This is a situation where advertising may be very effective to drive a user to conversion, particularly if there are discounts on the table. However, being a local business, it is unlikely to reach a particularly large audience. If there are time-sensitive offers or products available, the shop may not even be able to reach the threshold before the offer has expired.
In lieu of this, we propose an optional auditing mechanism that is more in line with how creative review operates today.
An SSP can offer an endpoint:
https://ssp.example/ad-review
where a DSP can provide an object of the sort:
{
'advertiser': 'https://advertiser.example',
'dsp': 'https://dsp.example',
'name': 'ad-123456789',
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp.example/ads/ad-123456789.wbn',
'categories': ['cat1', 'cat2', 'cat3'],
'formats': ['1024x768', '512x384']
}
This gives the SSP an opportunity to review the content of the ad, confirm that it belongs to the declared advertiser, and adheres to its declared categories (for brand safety), etc. Once review is completed, the DSP can query:
https://ssp.example/check-review
with
{
'name': 'ad-123456789'
}
and receive back
{
'token': 'review-token-123879',
'categories': ['cat4', 'cat5']
}
The DSP can associate this response with its advertisements and make it available for later use by
the SSP to enforce that creative review and validation occurred before display. If a DSP has a good
relationship with an SSP (for example, by having its own creative review process that is robust
enough to the SSP's standards), the SSP could also immediately provide a review token on the first
request without a need for the DSP to follow up on the /check-review endpoint. This trusted
pre-approval is how creative review processes tend to function today.
The categories allow an SSP to inject its own set of categories for the ad which can be used to
enforce per-publisher creative restrictions that the SSP is responsible for managing. This field
can be an empty list []. Note that the DSP and SSP can each provide their own distinct
categories values. The SSP can later read the DSP's categories in other contexts if allowed to
do so as a reader (as described elsewhere).
Perhaps the review token could be computed as something like (we'll talk more about this later):
content-hash = hash(ad-content),size(ad-content)
review-token = content-hash +
sign(ssp_secret_key, hash(dsp, ad-cbor-url, <dsp>categories, <ssp>categories, content-hash))
By including the ad-content here, we ensure that the DSP cannot change the images or behavior of
the creative to something else after approval.
We believe this will ensure bad actors are audited and removed from the online ad ecosystem while also keeping the wheels oiled for trustworthy players.
When a browser lands on an advertiser's site, it represents an opportunity to store private information in the browser about interest groups and any related ads (possibly for multiple advertisers) relevant to the user. The advertiser can initiate a call to some script (such as one provided by the DSP to which it has delegated responsibility) to achieve this.
The browser exposes an API:
.writeAdvertisementData(input)
The advertiser or DSP script produces an input of the form:
{
'owner': 'https://dsp.example',
'advertiser': 'https://advertiser.example',
'readers': {'https://ssp-1.example': ['categories', 'ssp-1', 'content-hash'],
'https://ssp-2.example': ['categories', 'ssp-2', 'content-hash']},
'groups': { 'interest-group-1': duration1,
'interest-group-2': duration2 },
'third-parties': {'https://third-party-1.example': 'https://third-party-1.example/js/metrics.js',
'https://third-party-2.example': 'https://third-party-2.example/js/metrics.js'},
'decision-logic-url': 'https://dsp.example/js/bidding.js',
'ads': [{'name': 'ad-123456789',
'formats': [{ 'aspect_ratio': '16:9',
'min_height': 400,
'max_height': 800 }],
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp.example/ads/ad-123456789.wbn',
'content-hash': 'd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e,262144',
'ssp-1': {'token': 'review-token-12345',
'categories': ['ssp-cat1', 'ssp-cat2']},
'categories': ['cat1', 'cat2', 'cat3'],
'cache-lifetime-secs': 21600,
'max-times-per-minute': 1,
'max-times-per-hour': 6,
'products': {'product-id-1': 'https://dsp.example/products/product-id-1.wbn',
'product-id-2': 'https://dsp.example/products/product-id-2.wbn'},
'privateData': { ... } },
{'name': 'ad-987654321',
'formats': ['1024x768', '512x384'],
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp.example/ads/ad-987654321.wbn',
'content-hash': 'dbb56e1ce1ed8d4605426e8e096c1f0e,123456',
'ssp-1': {'token': 'review-token-54321',
'categories': ['ssp-cat3']},
'ssp-2': {'token': 'review-token-09876',
'categories': []},
'categories': ['cat4', 'cat5'],
'cache-lifetime-secs': 86400,
'max-times-per-minute': 1,
'max-times-per-hour': 12,
'products': {'product-id-3': 'https://dsp.example/products/product-id-3.wbn',
'product-id-4': 'https://dsp.example/products/product-id-4.wbn'},
'privateData': { ... } }]
}
As in TURTLEDOVE, the executing origin must match owner for this call to succeed. (For the DSP
case, a helper iframe could be used.)
The browser should record whether .writeAdvertisementData(input) accepts this object. There may
be instances where the user is willing to accept first-party data from the advertiser, or
advertising from other advertisers managed by the owner, but rejects advertising for this
particular advertiser. The browser can report whether it accepted advertising from this advertiser
through the Aggregate Reporting API.
Receiving this feedback in an aggregate report will allow advertisers and DSPs to track metrics on
trackability. Advertisers frequently require some high-level metrics on how many of their users
are reachable in order to plan for budgeting and the like.
This object is significantly more complex than what is required in the .joinAdInterestGroup()
call in TURTLEDOVE, but it is not without cause. We list the reasons for each component
below. However, after receiving the object, the browser proceeds to act as largely described in
TURTLEDOVE: it adds the browser to all of the interest groups in the object (for auditing by the
user and the potential follow-up interest group
requests later),
caches what it needs from the ad and product web bundles, and so on.
We propose that these objects be namespaced by the value of (owner, advertiser). Browsers are
going to have natural limits on the amount of storage the user is willing to tolerate; these issues
are discussed further in TURTLEDOVE Issue #46 - Limit on Number of Interest Groups / Web
Bundles. In the event of reaching some global or
per-owner limit, the browser could apply some fair eviction policy which properly balances these
storage concerns.
While it may have been intended in TURTLEDOVE, we make explicit here that the 'advertiser' field value
does not need to match the current site. Advertisers will enter into co-ops that permit them to target
each other's users. For example, a pet food store may wish to cross-target with a pet toy store.
Knowing that a user is browsing cat food implies that they may be interested in cat toys, and vice versa.
Note that this is not a violation of privacy: the identity of the user isn't disclosed to a third party.
It only provides an opportunity for the third party to have a more effective upper funnel campaign than
may be available through contextual targeting alone.
We expect the ads value to have some industry-standard form (e.g., defined via IAB specs), and to
be largely opaque to the browser, but that the browser may have or gain awareness of specific
fields as part of some future improvement.
The browser could apply a policy decision (e.g., based on the outcome of a periodic privacy or W3C
compliance audit of owner) as to whether to accept ads outside of an uncorrelated interest
group request context, which could greatly reduce traffic for many participants, while still
potentially allowing participation without the permission of a gatekeeping entity.
The 'readers' value is similar to the same-named field in TURTLEDOVE, but each reader has a
different role than in TURTLEDOVE. Here, we are specifying which reader origins (SSPs) may access
which fields of interest-based advertisement objects created by owner. This is further explained
in c. Awareness of interest-based advertisement
objects.
We combine writing interest groups along with the web bundles for ads. This means that, in principle, ads can be delivered nearly immediately after browsing away from the site.
Recency is an important factor in the efficacy of ads. At NextRoll, we see that ad requests that come ten minutes after the browser has been on the site produce bids (roughly corresponding to utility) that are ~40% lower than requests that come one minute after the browser has visited the site. TURTLEDOVE suggests a later interest group request as much as four hours after being added to an interest group (losing ~70% of the utility as shown in the above graph). We expect that this would dangerously decrease publisher revenues.
Also by combining interest groups with ad web bundles, we no longer need to worry about minimum sizes for interest groups at this stage. Since the browser is on the advertiser's site, its set of interest groups already can be known in full to the advertiser through first-party cookies, and thus there is no reduction in privacy. Microtargeted interest groups are mitigated by opaque sandboxed rendering and ARAPI.
This is a critical feature for small advertisers and merchants, and also for advertisers that wish to perform product recommendation for rare or highly specific products. Refer to section 0 for a descriptive example of such an advertiser. A discussion is covered in TURTLEDOVE Issue #36.
With well-behaved participants, there's no particular need for the browser to make follow-up calls when it's already on the advertiser's site. We anticipate one follow-up call in the case of an advertiser delegating interest group management to a DSP. This should reduce the amount of background network calls the browser will need to make. (However, we will still maintain some interest group request, as described below, but this can be optional and much less frequent.)
Rather than writing one interest group at a time, we can write multiple. Accordingly, each needs to have its own TTL specified (as a duration). We expect the browser to record the current time the user was added to an interest group and to make available a value derived from that (recency) as described later in this document. (Time zone note: as we only provide a duration, the browser can use any time zone as long as its use is consistent.)
TURTLEDOVE appears to allow multiple interest groups to be added to the browser, but it seems to
require multiple calls to .joinAdInterestGroup(). This is unnecessary.
Similarly, we also write multiple ad web bundles at a time and allow specifying the sizes (and/or aspect ratios) at which an ad bundle knows how to render itself. This is necessary because we do not know the size of ad slots that will later be up for auction on a publisher's site. When it comes time to perform the on-device auction, we can eliminate the evaluation of ads that are not compatibly sized. If the browser itself has or gains awareness of the ad formats being auctioned (e.g., IAB standard ad units), it could quickly do this itself.
We also note here that the ads object can be an empty list []. It is possible that a campaign
or set of ads have not yet been created in order to target a set of interest groups. Ads can also
be provided later during the fetch ads request described
below as in
TURTLEDOVE.
As part of the optional validation process described in section 0, ads may declare their categories so publishers can decide whether they would want such an ad on their site. However, publishers need to trust that the declared categories are not a lie. This is the purpose of the SSP review tokens. SSPs are also able to provide their own list of categories for each creative, which enables a tighter integration of publisher brand safety between the publisher and SSP. The browser itself can remain mostly unaware of this validation concept.
During section 0, we described a mechanism through which SSPs can perform a validation process for creatives. As the market functions today, there are two ways of doing this: with a pre-approval process, and approving some time after the first bid is made (delayed-approval). We consider both options here:
We stated earlier that the SSP provides a token to the DSP of the sort:
review-token = content-hash +
sign(ssp_secret_key, hash(dsp, ad-cbor-url, <dsp>categories, <ssp>categories, content-hash))
During a later SSP-controlled auction, its script running in the browser can read its own review
token from DSP-provided metadata, plus the content-hash property, and compute:
expected-hash = hash(dsp, ad-cbor-url, <dsp>categories, <ssp>categories, content-hash)
and verify this hash against the signed review token using an ssp_public_key bundled with the SSP
script.
The auction can then select winning advertisements only after validating their review tokens (and applying brand safety checks, etc).
Later, the SSP/publisher can use a new browser facility (described in k. Verified content rendering) for content-validated rendering of web bundles; e.g,. create
<fenced-iframe src="https://rs.http3.lol/index.php?q=aHR0cDovL2RzcC5leGFtcGxlL2Fkcy9hZC0xMjM0NTY3ODkud2Ju",
content-digest="d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e",
content-size="262144"/>
which will only be rendered if the digest and size of the bundle content match the declared attributes.
If the content does not match, the ad will not display; this incentivizes good behavior among all participants claiming use of a creative review process.
Note that in this scheme, only the SSP has to download the content before this validation check
(this is why the ad-content is part of the hash on the SSP's side). In the end, the SSP can set
its own review policy, token format, and so on.
In a delayed-approval situation, the DSP has a relationship with the SSP that allows their ads to be run without an in-depth initial creative review before display. In this case, the SSP needs the ability to revoke prior automatic approvals.
This can be achieved by including a time component in the review token, and requiring that DSPs
refresh tokens periodically to maintain approval status. The time component should be shorter than
that of a normal pre-approval, but longer than any periodic fetch-ads refresh interval performed
by browsers.
Otherwise, to avoid violating user privacy an additional platform facility would be needed to support revocation of prior review tokens.
We incorporate a set of product IDs with their associated web bundles a la Product-level Turtledove. These are at the ad level because different creatives may want to incorporate different product sets. This element of the object is optional if delivering a static ad.
TURTLEDOVE doesn't appear to support dynamic creative out of the box, and this addition either actually provides a mechanism, or makes it explicit.
We also incorporate a privateData object a la Outcome-based Turtledove.
Note that Outcome-based Turtledove calls this object userSignals. We think this element can be used
for a variety of signals that we wouldn't want to escape from the browser that can be used in the
bidding function, perhaps not even necessarily related to the user. Examples include metadata about the campaign,
advertiser, or the ad itself. This is also a good place to add additional metadata not just for the
bidding function, but to feed into the Aggregate Reporting API.
The privateData object can also contain information to remove the ad from contention if an
interest group expires due to its TTL.
An explicit example of a privateData field could be bucketed-probability, which, through the
Aggregate Reporting API, could help make sure enough users are added to the bucket and provide
a feedback signal to DSPs that their models are well-calibrated for advertising in the wild, rather
than just relying on holdout test datasets.
A clearer distinction between SSP and DSP, which TURTLEDOVE lacks. This will be important later
for reducing networking, but as seen here, the bidding.js file is provided by the DSP. Many DSPs prefer
to control their own bidding logic; if necessary, an SSP that also sometimes functions as a DSP can simply
repeat the SSP's URLs in the DSP fields.
For sophisticated DSPs, the primary benefit of SSPs is the management of publisher networks, not collecting user signals or providing bidding algorithms. A discussion on this topic occurs in TURTLEDOVE Issue #37 - Clarification on Entities.
TURTLEDOVE does not have a mechanism for third-party tags, such as impression beacons, to be attached to ads. Of course, granular impression beacons are off the table in order to maintain privacy, but we should find some way of preserving aggregate data for third parties; it's important for auditing and providing some choice on the market for advertisers who may want to use analytics tools that are separate from the SSP and DSP responsible for showing impressions.
We suggest that the reporting metrics specified by a third-party script can be used in the Aggregate Reporting API (ARAPI), but in a separate storage than what the DSP or SSP may want to track. ARAPI would then function as usual, just with these new third-party entities as additional consumers of reports. This is really nothing more than an additional namespace.
This is more apropos to ARAPI, but we include it here for convenience and completeness. ARAPI currently specifies as an example:
const entryHandle = window.writeOnlyReport.get('campaign-123');
entryHandle.set('country', 'usa');
entryHandle.append('visits', '1');
entryHandle.reportAfter(2 * kMsecPerDay);
entryHandle.expireAfter(7 * kMsecPerDay);
which would then later generate a report like:
{
'entryName': 'campaign-123',
'country': 'usa',
'visits': '1'
}
ARAPI does not clearly specify to whom this report would be sent, but we presume it would be sent to the DSP and SSP in an encrypted format, to be aggregated and decrypted by a helper service, as discussed in the Multi-Browser Aggregation Service Explainer. We suggest a minor change to ARAPI that declares who's performing the in-browser aggregation and will receive the report:
const dspHandle = window.writeOnlyReport.get('https://dsp.example', 'campaign-123');
const thirdPartyHandle = window.writeOnlyReport.get('https://third-party.example', 'campaign-123');
These URLs effectively define separate namespaces where reports can have different keys or methods of computing metrics. For example:
dspHandle.set('country', 'usa');
dspHandle.append('visits', '1');
dspHandle.reportAfter(2 * kMsecPerDay);
dspHandle.expireAfter(7 * kMsecPerDay);
thirdPartyHandle.set('region-type', 'suburban');
thirdPartyHandle.append('news-domain-visits', '1');
thirdPartyHandle.reportAfter(1 * kMsecPerDay);
thirdPartyHandle.expireAfter(3 * kMsecPerDay);
From here, the browser would generate two reports:
{
'entryName': 'campaign-123',
'country': 'usa',
'visits': '1'
}
{
'entryName': 'campaign-123',
'region-type': 'suburban',
'news-domain-visits': '1'
}
The first would be sent to the DSP and the second to the third party. The two reports cannot be mixed, and are encrypted separately to be sent to different servers. We believe this maintains privacy while still keeping third-party tags in the ecosystem.
The browser has a variety of functions to perform in the background. Here's what we see as valuable:
Each potential ad (or product) to be shown has a URL for the ad web bundle to be downloaded. Given the number of advertising entities on the web, and also given the number of potential ad sizes a browser would have to cache for delivery, storage in the browser could be a significant issue (e.g., for mobile browsers).
We suggest that web bundles can also be downloaded at win time in the eventual internal auction. At first blush, this may seem like a violation of privacy, but if the browser is consistently making requests to download ad web bundles, such requests at win time would be indistinguishable from a background request.
This largely functions the same as in the TURTLEDOVE proposal. We keep the same nomenclature as in
TURTLEDOVE with an endpoint /fetch-ads, but the response just contains URLs to ad web bundles,
and the fetch target is the owner of the related interest groups, not an intermediary "ad
network". The actual downloading of the bundles is described above in section
2b. Here, the
browser queries
https://dsp.example/.well-known/fetch-ads
with
{
'advertiser': 'https://advertiser.example',
'groups': ['interest-group-1', 'interest-group-2']
}
and receives
{
'owner': 'https://dsp.example',
'advertiser': 'https://advertiser.example',
'readers': {'https://ssp-1.example': ['categories', 'ssp-1', ...],
'https://ssp-2.example': [...]},
'ads': ...
}
Note that the set of groups in this request, in contrast to the set written in section 1 would be subject to privacy guidelines such as k-anonymity and/or differential privacy as discussed in the original TURTLEDOVE proposal. Since the browser is off the advertiser's site, first-party data is no longer available, and we should not reveal too much about the user. The browser will only send groups in which the user is still a member (i.e., if past a previously-specified TTL for a group, that group won't appear here).
The DSP responds with the same object as described in section 1. This may seem redundant, but we include it for a couple of reasons.
One, the DSP may have a desire to update the object that was supplied on the advertiser's site. This could be because certain ads or campaigns have been paused, creatives could have been refreshed, or there may be a new offer or sale that would interest the user.
Two, it's possible that the DSP has added the browser to interest groups that do not have creatives available at the time on the advertiser's site. They may be in the process of being validated by an SSP, or an advertiser is waiting to launch a sale, etc.
The browser can set policies here on how often this fetch request needs to be made. If no ads have been provided, it may call more frequently, versus following the web bundle guidelines on expiration.
Another difference from TURTLEDOVE is that this call explicitly goes to the DSP. This was part of a discussion in TURTLEDOVE Issue #37 - Clarification on Entities. Given that these signals are all produced by the DSP, and the DSP has no desire to reveal its interest group to SSPs, there is no reason to pass through an SSP first. Any concerns about creative validation are covered by section 2a. This should significantly reduce network traffic on the internet so requests don't have to go to an SSP only to be forwarded to a DSP.
As in Aggregate Reporting API.
This section discusses what calls are made to produce publisher data for bidding signals. Some of these actions must occur in specific contexts (e.g., helper iframes, which are omitted from the diagram).
When the browser lands on a publisher page, an SSP script is run that queries the SSP with a
publisherRequest object, an example of such request is below and we include mostly the main
fields we believe to be important:
{
'url': 'https://publisher.example/path/to/page',
'ad-slot-id': '1234',
'ad-sizes': ['320x480', '1024x768', '1920x1080'],
'restricted-categories': ['cat1', 'cat2'],
'auction-mechanics': {'floor-price': 0.75,
'auction-type': 'second price',
'deal-ids': ['1098', '2501']},
'metadata': {'page-categories': ['cats', 'dogs'],
'above-the-fold': true,
...
'published-date': '2020-09-19'}
}
The required fields are strictly what's necessary to determine which ads would even be
valid for the slot. The floor-price lets the publisher declare how much it's willing to
let the slot go for, the auction-type declares to the DSP how their bidding functions should
operate, and the deal-ids allow DSPs to take advantage of pre-arranged deals
with the publisher. Finally, metadata is a catch-all object where the publisher can declare
whatever it desires about the page to SSPs; the fields present above are just potential examples.
All of these fields can be used in generating bids and evaluating auctions.
The SSP, on its own and/or by forwarding the publisher request to its integrated
DSPs is responsible for sending back to the browser a publisherResponse object:
{ 'dsps': { 'https://dsp-1.example': { 'ads': [ { 'advertiser': 'https://advertiser-1.example',
'third-parties': {'https://third-party-1.example': 'https://third-party-1.example/js/metrics.js',
'https://third-party-2.example': 'https://third-party-2.example/js/metrics.js'},
'decision-logic-url': 'https://dsp-1.example/js/bidding.js',
'name': 'ad-123456789',
'formats': [{ 'aspect_ratio': '16:9',
'min_height': 400,
'max_height': 800 }],
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp-1.example/ads/ad-123456789.wbn',
'ssp-token': {'token': 'review-token-12345',
'isPreApproved': true,
'categories': ['ssp-cat1']},
'categories': ['cat1', 'cat2', 'cat3'],
'cache-lifetime-secs': 21600,
'max-times-per-minute': 1,
'max-times-per-hour': 6,
'products': {'product-id-1': 'https://dsp-1.example/products/product-id-1.wbn',
'product-id-2': 'https://dsp-1.example/products/product-id-2.wbn'},
'privateData': { ... }
}
],
'publisherSignals': { 'groups': { 'group1': ttl1, 'group2': ttl2 },
'signature': 'aGVsbG8sIHdvcmxkIQo=',
... }
},
'https://dsp-2.example': { 'ads': [ { 'advertiser': 'https://advertiser-2.example',
'third-parties': {'https://third-party-3.example': 'https://third-party-3.example/js/metrics.js'},
'decision-logic-url': 'https://dsp-2.example/js/bidding.js',
'name': 'ad-987654321',
'formats': ['1024x768', '512x384'],
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp-2.example/ads/ad-987654321.wbn',
'ssp-token': {'isPreApproved': false},
'categories': ['cat4'],
'cache-lifetime-secs': 86400,
'max-times-per-minute': 3,
'max-times-per-hour': 30,
'products': {'product-id-3': 'https://dsp-2.example/products/product-id-3.wbn'},
'privateData': { ... }
}
],
'publisherSignals': { ... } }
}
}
Clearly, a good chunk of these data come from integrated DSPs (recall that an SSP can function like a DSP, if it so chooses).
This response is a modified version of what we saw in section 1. The SSP is already known and therefore there's no need for a set of SSP trust tokens within each ad.
Interest groups are no longer required, but can be useful. We explain this in more detail below.
Given that during the publisher request, there is no access to the interest groups or
ads already in the browser, it is unknown to the SSP, or its integrated DSPs, whether the
browser is primed to bid on any ads already. This means that 1) the SSP must communicate with
all of its DSPs for every publisher request, and 2) DSPs will want to respond to every such
publisher request even if they don't have a contextual ad to show. That means the ads field
in each DSP object can be an empty list.
Each ad has a privateData object that can provide signals about the ad, campaign, etc. as before.
However, in addition, even if no ad is present in the DSP's object, there is a higher level
publisherSignals object where the DSP can provide signals that will be passed into its bidding.js
function. This object can contain signals from the publisherRequest object or additional signals
that the SSP chooses to provide the DSP when querying them. The point is to provide additional
flexibility to SSPs and DSPs when it comes time to bid. In particular, the publisher's auction-mechanics
object is a very important field for the bidding.js function. Of course, publisherSignals can
be an empty object.
To the point that publisherSignals can be an empty object, we suggest that it be acceptable that
a publisherResponse is not required (though probably recommended) to generate a
bid. This could cut down
on overall network traffic if a DSP is not required to respond, but as stated, it's likely that the
publisherSignals will always be valuable.
Another distinction from TURTLEDOVE is that this response does not contain any computed bids.
While the TURTLEDOVE proposal on the surface seems reasonable in supplying an actual bid back, this
really isn't particularly feasible, because the price of ads depends highly on how often the user
has already seen a particular ad, or ads from the same advertiser. We'll address how those signals
can be provided later, but the point is, pricing is very dynamic. For this reason, every ad
returned here links to a bidding.js function, and the ads object from each DSP is a list.
(Although we expect bidding logic to be shared in some way among a DSP's ads; e.g., all ads for a
particular advertiser could reference the same bidding logic.)
Note that because the SSP has neither pre-computed bids nor access to each DSP's bidding.js
function, it is unable to perform any internal auction to select a winner. All potential ads must
be sent back to the browser for evaluation.
Many of these issues are discussed in TURTLEDOVE Issue #38 - Contextual Bid and TURTLEDOVE Issue #37 - Clarification on Entities.
As seen above, we allow for
DSPs to send back ad-specific data as well as general data in publisherSignals.
This field could be used to add the user to interest groups based on the context of the current site, if allowed by that publisher and SSP. For example:
'publisherSignals': { 'groups': { 'group1': ttl1, 'group2': ttl2 },
'signature': 'aGVsbG8sIHdvcmxkIQo=',
... }
A DSP's bidding.js (decision-logic-url) will have a signature of:
generate_bid(adSignals, publisherSignals, browserSignals) {
... // all sorts of logic
}
update_interest_groups(publisherSignals, browserSignals) {
...
}
update_interest_groups and generate_bid will be called in a private sandbox context established
by a new platform facility for the evaluation of each DSP's bidding logic.
update_interest_groups will only be called based on one of the parameters to the new
runDecisionLogic() platform function (see
e. runDecisionLogic()).
The purpose of this mechanism is to balance the desire of DSPs to use contextual information to
update user interest groups, while also allowing publishers and SSPs to remain in control of
whether that may occur (e.g., via a paid service add-on).
Setting user interest groups this way can't directly escape back to the SSP or DSP.
Note that this will work equivalently to what happens on the advertiser's
site (via
writeAdvertisementData()).
At first blush, this may seem like it lacks value: aren't interest groups designed to capture a user's interest for a particular advertiser? Well, we consider this is either a replacement or complementary mechanism to FLoC. We find that SSPs are generally responsible for policies on how publisher data may be used by the DSP. Allowing these group updates can be determined by individual SSPs, which can be coordinated with their integrated DSPs. It's also possible that SSPs can more granularly control their policy on updates on a per-publisher basis. In short, we find that this mechanism maintains the functionality and flexibility that exists today.
The base TURTLEDOVE proposal permits some use like this through a cross-domain iframe:
The API must be called from a window (top-level or iframe) whose origin matches the owner. This could be on WeReallyLikeShoes.com, or could be a cross-domain iframe — maybe RunningShoeReviews.com writes articles about shoes sold by WeReallyLikeShoes.com, and the review site has an agreement which lets the retailer add people to an interest group with 'name': 'reads-reviews'. It should also be possible for a site owner to include a cross-domain iframe without giving it this capability.
However, this requires a direct coordination between individual publishers and DSPs, which can be a tall order for broad interest groups.
As an example use case, a user may be browsing a page about video games. A games company can target pages about games strictly, but if the user browses away to a news site, it may be desirable to continue advertising games to them. They've expressed interest in the topic even though they're no longer on a page about games. The browser would be responsible for adding these interest groups to the browser storage, and fetching any additional ads from the DSP. Setting up cross-domain iframes on the set of pages on the web about video games is likely intractable. Instead, the set of publishers willing to integrate with an SSP that allows for the DSP to set a "video games" interest group in the browser unlocks this capability. And, as previously stated, this capability can be managed between the publisher and SSP granularly.
Note that this is not an opportunity to inject full ad web bundles for these interest groups. In this moment, this should only be allowable through pure contextual advertising. We only allow these interest groups to have ad web bundles associated with them through the background fetch ads mechanism. Recall that this background request to fetch ads is subject to privacy constraints, such as k-anonymity, so there's no opportunity for a DSP to learn the user's browsing habits at any significant level of granularity.
We believe that this additional mechanism opens up a lot of additional advertising flexibility with no sacrifice to user privacy.
In the current advertising market, many important signals are computable by DSPs that have profound effects on ad prices. These will no longer be available in the original TURTLEDOVE proposal. Here, we suggest that the browser itself compute some of these signals itself to maintain both flexible pricing that props up publisher revenues while maintaining user privacy. These ideas are discussed in TURTLEDOVE Issue #5 - Ad Signals in the auction and group membership and Frequency Capping and Optimization.
This is not an exhaustive list of signals that could be provided by the browser, but they are some particularly critical ones that certainly require some resolution that is not provided by the TURTLEDOVE proposal.
These can be provided in a browserSignals object like:
{
'interest-group-1-recency': time-since-joining-interest-group-1,
'interest-group-2-recency': time-since-joining-interest-group-2,
'ad-total-frequency': total-times-ad-has-been-displayed,
'ad-day-frequency': times-ad-has-been-shown-last-24-hours,
'advertiser-total-frequency': total-times-user-has-seen-ad-from-advertiser,
'advertiser-day-frequency': times-user-has-seen-ad-from-advertiser-last-24-hours
}
Recall that when adding the browser to an interest group, we had an object:
'groups': { 'interest-group-1': duration1,
'interest-group-2': duration2 }
At group joining time, the browser stores the current timestamp T1 and uses durationN as a TTL.
At bid time, the browser looks at the current timestamp T2 and computes the recency as T2 - T1
for each interest group and adds it to the browserSignals object for the particular ad
bidding.js calculation. There should also be a mechanism for binning these recencies to report
back in the Aggregate Reporting API for data analysis and improved bidding. Within the browser,
there's no concern about passing these fields as they are. For reporting, suitable noise (for
differential privacy) or attaining a threshold for k-anonymity can be applied to the timestamp to
avoid identification of the user, while maintaining the signal.
Alternatively, the
generate_bid()
function itself could compute this (assuming it will have access to the browser's UTC epoch time
and each group's join time), but we include this as a simple concrete example.
Each ad object has some identity key (e.g,. (owner, advertiser, ad-cbor-url)) and contains an
advertiser field. The browser can keep incremental counts under both of these keys, for both
total frequency and daily frequency at ad and advertiser level. Similarly to recency, the browser
can add these to the browserSignals object to be passed into the particular ad bidding.js
calculation and provide a mechanism for binning for reporting and data analysis.
To address the concern about frequency capping (halting displaying an ad because
it's been shown too many times already), a DSP can include the frequency cap in
the privateData object, which will also be passed into bidding.js. By comparing
the frequency cap to the passed in value from browserSignals, the bidding.js
function can choose to return a bid of 0, effectively preventing the ad from
being shown.
Another potential addition to browserSignals is how recently a particular ad has
been shown to the user, or even a list of the N most recent timestamps an ad has
been shown:
{
'ad-impression-recencies': [ts1, ts4, ts7, ts10],
'advertiser-impression-recencies': [ts2, ts3, ts5, ts6, ts8, ts9, ts11],
}
In addition to being useful as a predictive signal for machine learning models,
these timestamps can also be used more granularly inside the browser by the
generate_bid() function
to obviate the need for the 'max-times-per-minute' and 'max-times-per-hour'
fields in the advertisement data
object. This smoother control will allow for more dynamic pricing a less
clumped approach to ad delivery. For example, parameters like
{
'max-times-per-minute': 1,
'max-times-per-hour': 5
}
could just lead to five ads being shown in the first five minutes of an hour.
A sophisticated generate_bid() function can ensure this is distributed more
evenly (or less!) as dictated by an optimization algorithm.
From here, each ad that is in the browser (interest-based and contextual) needs to
be evaluated for pricing before being passed into the auction. This is largely similar
to the TURTLEDOVE proposal. Recall that a DSP's bidding.js has a signature of:
generate_bid(adSignals, publisherSignals, browserSignals) {
... // all sorts of logic
}
update_interest_groups(publisherSignals, browserSignals) {
...
}
The adSignals object is the exact same object from section
1 that is the
input for .writeAdvertisementData(input) (or the similar spec returned in a contextual bid
response). This ensures that the generate_bid() function has as many signals about the ad as
possible, including the crucial privateData object that can contain probability estimates,
frequency caps, blocklists of interest groups for negative targeting (for example, that a user has
already converted). Note that the groups object is also passed in, which allows for this
"negative targeting" ([TODO: reconcile with contradictory statement in platform features section
which prohibits access to groups except by the UA itself]).
The publisherSignals object is extracted from the publisherResponse
object that comes from the DSP key matching this generate_bid() call. This is an opportunity to apply bid
modifications on whether the ad is above the fold, or if an advertiser has brand safety concerns,
and doesn't want their ads shown on pages about particular topics (this blocklist for the
advertiser would be in the adSignals' privateData object. If there was no publisherResponse
object, the publisherSignals object here would be {}).
Finally, there's the browserSignals object
that supplies data for other critical bid modifiers, including frequency capping.
We believe at this point, DSPs will be well-equipped to produce bid prices that maintain as much advertising efficacy, publisher revenues, and user privacy as possible.
The selection of interest-targeted advertisements for which bids should be generated, and the
generate_bid() calls will occur by means of two new platform facilities as described below
(matchingAdvertisements() and runDecisionLogic()).
Finally, there's the matter of the auction. We make a clarification over TURTLEDOVE and specify that while the browser is responsible for the computation of the auction, that computation's logic is specified by the publisher (or an SSP provides this logic to their publisher network). This is to address concerns raised by PARRROT. We wanted to provide the same functionality as PARRROT, but reserve our critiques of it for the Considered Alternatives section.
The publisher is responsible for triggering the auction. In practice we expect this will be a call out to an SSP-provided script most of the time.
In order to access interest-based ads, that script should create an iframe on some SSP origin which
was previously specified as a reader in some writeAdvertisementData() calls.
Eventually, that reader context should activate the auction context sandbox by calling
navigator.advertising.activateSandbox(...) (see
f. activateSandbox()).
This grants access to browser-private data such as ads matching the interest groups in which the
user is a member, the calculation of bid prices for them, browser signals, and so on.
The only information which can directly escape after activating this sandbox is for the SSP (or publisher) -provided script to make fenced frame rendering calls as described below.
The publisher (or SSP) is responsible for implementing a function like:
evaluate_auction(submittedAds, privateData) {
... // all sorts of logic
}
This function is responsible for returning the winning ad objects and the final prices as determined by the auction mechanism.
The submittedAds object could look like:
[
{
'advertiser': 'https://advertiser1.example',
'dsp': 'https://dsp1.example',
'name': 'ad-123456789',
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp1.example/ads/ad-123456789.wbn',
'categories': ['cat1', 'cat2', 'cat3'],
'format': '512x384',
'bid': 2.64,
'deal-ids': []
},
{
'advertiser': 'https://advertiser2.example',
'dsp': 'https://dsp2.example',
'name': 'ad-987654321',
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp2.example/ads/ad-987654321.wbn',
'categories': ['cat4'],
'format': '512x384',
'bid': 1.72,
'deal-ids': ['1098']
},
...
]
The privateData object is at the publisher's discretion to control any logic within the
evaluate_auction(...) function. For example, it may contain metadata about which deals
are active, how they're priced, whether to execute a first- or second-price auction, etc.
Once the auction is complete, the browser needs to be instructed to render the ad and compute any reporting metrics necessary.
This may be contentious, but we propose that the internal auction in the browser be a second price auction. This used to be the standard in the industry until header bidding precipitated a shift to first price auctions.
Unfortunately, first price auctions are subject to significant game theoretic distortions. When determining the price of a bid, the concern of the advertiser is to extract as much economic utility as possible. As with any exchange of money, there is some point at which the purchaser would neither gain nor lose any utility. We call this the "true value." It's not an acceptable price to bid in a first price auction, because the purchaser gains nothing from the purchase.
Therefore, a bid in a first price auction must be less than this true value. However, it must not be so low as to be below the price of the market, otherwise the purchaser will not win the auction. Ergo, the goal of bidding is to bid as little above the going rate on the market as possible, while being below the true value.
TURTLEDOVE (and TERN) do not provide any mechanism for buyers to get an insight into the going rates of the market. They are not notified of any losses, and in a first-price scenario, what they pay is solely a function of their own bids.
Second price auctions avoid this quandary, by having the highest bid paying the second-highest
bid in the auction. When auctioning off a single item, second price auctions are mathematically
proven to have a winning strategy of bidding the true value. Given the lack of insight into the market,
and also the increased complexity of the bidding.js function in a first price auction due to game-theoretic
modifications, we strongly recommend moving back to second price auctions as the standard in the
industry.
The concern of publishers, of course, is that second price auctions can reduce win prices,
particularly if purchasers are in collusion. This is why in the publisherRequest
object, we specify that the floor-price set by the publisher is a required field to be
sent to the SSP, and consequently, all DSPs. This effectively makes a publisher a bidder
in its own auction, guaranteeing a minimum second price. Note that this does not alter the
dominant strategy of other partipants from bidding their true value.
Second price auctions are a superior mechanism for keeping participants honest, ensuring entities with deeper knowledge of market prices don't have significant advantages in the auctions, and reducing the amount of computation that will have to occur on users' machines.
A further benefit of second price auctions is that it removes any incentive to use win price as a vector of entropy to try and identify users. If the winner never receives back the bid price they used, but the price of second bidder instead, it only becomes possible to inject information if all bidders collude.
Once the auction is run and the winning ads are selected, they need to be rendered. We believe it makes sense for these ads to be rendered in a fenced frame. However, some other proposals, such as Product-level Turtledove, suggest that the browser itself should be responsible for the logic of assembling dynamic creatives.
We're not in favor of this. We believe it will limit the flexibility that dynamic creatives offer to the ecosystem. Rather, we suggest that the rendering logic be provided by:
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp.example/ads/ad-123456789.wbn'
and that this web bundle be given access by the browser to the other objects necessary to render the ad, such as:
'products': {'product-id-1': 'https://dsp.example/products/product-id-1.wbn',
'product-id-2': 'https://dsp.example/products/product-id-2.wbn'}
This will enable such logic as tying the category of the product(s) to the category of the page, providing a better user experience and greater ad efficacy. This is just an example; there are likely to be more reasons that the ad web bundle itself should have these data available for it to be rendered as the DSP sees fit.
As described in
f. activateSandbox(),
rendering an ad (via
g. render()) is the only visible
outcome from the auction context sandbox. Any other outcome is visible only via aggregate
reporting.
a. TURTLEDOVE
TURTLEDOVE is the basis of this proposal, but we feel it is not fleshed out enough, and also required some extensions to support some heavily-used aspects of the adtech ecosystem, including product recommendations, third-party tags, creative review process, and limitations on interest group sizes that are too severe for meaningful optimization.
We believe that TERN addresses all these concerns while still maintaining the same level of privacy that TURTLEDOVE accomplishes.
We adopted the core approach of Product-level Turtledove in TERN. The main departures are the creative review process, and eliminating the scrambling of ordered product recommendations in the creatives themselves. Ranking is extremely important for optimization, and the main concern addressed by the scrambling is to prevent "creepy" ads from being assembled ad hoc while avoiding review. To us, this appears to be a very minor concern given the impact of removing effective ranking.
A creative review process is provided in TERN, but functions more similarly to what we see today. We think the approach here is plenty robust and will enable the removal of bad actors from the market.
We also adopted the core approach from Outcome-based Turtledove for providing more granular
bidding signals within the browser. Really, the main difference is that we just renamed the
object from userSignals to privateData to 1) recognize that more than just user signals
can be provided (e.g. campaign frequency caps, category blocklists, etc.), and 2) that the
name explicitly describes that these data are not to leave the browser.
The other major proposal in Outcome-based Turtledove is the ask that ads have a number of attempted deliveries on a sufficiently sized set of users before they can actually be displayed. We're not supportive of such a mechanism due to its strong, negative implications for small advertisers and the platforms they run on. There are many such advertisers on the market today, generally represented by marketplaces such as Amazon, Rakuten, and Yelp. The small merchants on these platforms deserve an opportunity to advertise to their potential customers on the internet, where these users have likely discovered them. These marketplaces deserve an opportunity to offer their merchants a digital advertising product on the web. This is an instance where both small and large players can be substantially impacted for the same underlying cause.
d. SPARROW
We have also considered SPARROW. In principle, we're supportive of what SPARROW aims to accomplish. Our main issue with the proposal is the trusted, third-party servers that are responsible for executing machine learning models.
Upon our consideration, we were left with a bunch of unresolved questions:
- Who would be responsible for these servers? Running real-time bidding systems is expensive and requires years of knowledge to fully develop.
- How would payment be structured for DSPs running on these servers? Traffic seems like one way, but some models are larger and more computationally complex. Presumably, since there's now a third party, costs for RTB would increase.
- We regularly ship large models (in the tens of gigabytes) multiple times daily. Across all players in the market, would we expect this third party to be able to scale well?
- Given the broad array of types, complexities, and sizes of models throughout the market, how would this third party guarantee suitable instances for all players? Would there be shared tenancy? How would resource contention be resolved?
- How would a DSP have any introspection into the live performance of their models? Sometimes software with bugs gets shipped and requires a quick rollback. This seems like a very real, significant risk.
- Given all of the above, how will such a service be live within the stated timeline for the deprecation of third-party cookies?
Without clear resolutions to these questions, we're much more supportive of a TURTLEDOVE-like approach, of which TERN is an example.
e. PARRROT
PARRROT is a proposal that is less focused on the overall mechanism of performing advertising without third-party cookies, though it presupposes a mechanism like SPARROW or Dovekey. Instead, the primary problem it attempts to address is maintaining publisher control of the auction mechanism, including preserving the ability of publishers to create direct deals with advertisers and DSPs, which may be subject to specialized auction logic and pricing.
TURTLEDOVE intentionally under-specified how the auction mechanism would work and what party would be responsible for executing it. TERN originally inherited this lack of clarity, and this is the main criticism PARRROT levies against TERN.
We found the concerns and functionality proposed by PARRROT to be reasonable. Thus, we have updated the TERN proposal to incorporate publisher control of the auction.
f. Dovekey
Dovekey is an attempt to address some identified issues in SPARROW. It operates over the concept of "materializing" a machine learning model into a set of key-value entries, effectively removing the computational and deployment issues in SPARROW. However, we find that this introduces a host of problems on its own, while still keeping some of the unresolved issues we raise in the SPARROW section.
We mostly take issue with the notion of "materializing" a machine learning model. The power of machine learning is its ability to infer on unseen data. Dovekey asks that DSPs predict what is likely to be seen and unseen in order to gain sufficient "coverage" in the keyspace. The proposal suggests that a record of missed opportunities through the Aggregate Reporting API can provide a sense of where coverage is lacking.
Unfortunately, the delayed or noisy ARAPI diminishes the ability to explore the space of possible keys that make it possible to achieve the promise of digital advertising: reaching the right person, with the right message, at the right time, in the right context. This seems only possible in those cases where each combination of contextual (or interest group) features passes the threshold of k-anonymity, something that, quite possibly, only the biggest publishers and advertisers can cross.
As a thought experiment, consider a deep neural network that has been trained for image classification. If one were asked to materialize this model into a key-value store, attempting to predict an adequate number of image feature combinations, how would this be accomplished? In a very real sense, the request is to create keys that look like, or kind of look like, images that users would be expected to input into the model. This is a huge space to cover. There's an exponential growth in the number of keys as more coverage is attempted. The model, on the other hand, compresses effectively to perform inference on any appropriately formatted image as input.
This is the primary critique against Dovekey: the size of its keyspace. It is worth the exercise to see how this keyspace explodes under standard digital advertising practices. We would expect, even for a simplistic machine learning model, to consider a basic set of features. For a moderately-sized DSP, we may see these features having cardinalities, within an order of magnitude, of what we see below:
publisher ~10^6
page category ~10^1
ad slot ~10^2
advertiser ~10^4
campaign ~10^1
ad ~10^2
interest group ~10^2
product ~10^6
frequency ~10^2
recency ~10^2
That is to say, there may be a million publishers to consider, each with ten page categories, and 100 slots across their site. Then, for each of those, there could be 10k advertisers to consider, each with 10 campaigns, 100 ads of various sizes and messaging, 100 interest groups, and a million products. Then, perhaps we have a predefined granularity of 100 frequency buckets and 100 recency buckets.
Note that these numbers are far larger for major players. This is also a lackluster model with only a handful of basic features. There are even other basic features missing, such as time of day, day of week, geography, etc. We'll keep it very simple for now.
Multiplying all these combinations together is a space of 10^28 keys. Beyond even this, Dovekey would be responsible for maintaining the keyspaces for all DSPs. But we'll run with 10^28 ~= 2^93.
On the value side, perhaps a bid is a 4-byte float. At 4*2^93 = 2^95 bytes, and with 2^60 bytes in an exabyte, this comes to 2^35 exabytes for each DSP. Note that this doesn't account for the storage of the keys. This does not appear to be tractable.
Perhaps we can leverage the notion of providing keys that gain a sufficient level of coverage. But what is acceptable here? Perhaps we say that a DSP can only have a terabyte, 2^40 bytes, of storage in Dovekey. But on the bid values alone, this requires reducing the key coverage by a factor of 2^55. Even giving the DSP a petabyte of bid values reduces key coverage by 2^45.
Then there's the issue of failed lookups. In a W3C meeting, the proposers of Dovekey suggested that fallback keys could be provided. The proposal goes that if we wanted a key such as:
{ publisher, advertiser, campaign }
that the DSP would also provide keys such as:
{ }
{ publisher }
{ advertiser }
{ campaign }
{ publisher, advertiser }
{ publisher, campaign }
{ advertiser, campaign }
for a total of 8 keys. For a set of N components of the key, it will take 2^N keys to cover all possible fallbacks. Once again, for our very naive model represented above, we have 10 key components, which implies a 2^10 = 1024 multiplier on the number of keys to write into Dovekey.
This exercise exemplifies the power of machine learning. Not only can we infer on previously unseen data, but machine learning is remarkable in its ability to compress information. "Materializing" a model feels like a non-starter: it suffers from exponential space complexity in nearly all of its aspects.
There are still remaining questions about the feasibility of Dovekey because it's inspired by SPARROW:
- Who would be responsible for these servers?
- How would payment be structured for DSPs running on these servers? Traffic seems like one way, and storage costs must surely be a factor. Presumably, since there's now a third party, costs for RTB would increase.
- How would a DSP have any introspection into the live performance of their models?
- Given all of the above, how will such a service be live within the stated timeline for the deprecation of third-party cookies?
g. FLoC
FLoC is a proposed mechanism that allows the browser to bucket users into similar cohorts based on the user's browsing habits, to associate a coarse identifier with these, and to disclose a user's current cohort identifier to any site on demand.
We are happy with the FLoC proposal, though it is not sufficient to support the online advertising ecosystem on its own (and it doesn't claim to do so). It's hard to imagine a DSP rejecting the ability to receive additional signals derived from the browser that can be useful in machine learning contexts.
However, we have a mechanism that allows DSPs to define their own behavior-based groups in a privacy-preserving way. This is not a replacement of FLoC and can be complementary.
Before writing the advertisement data object as described in section
1, a model can
be applied server-side to generate predictions which can be packed into the privateData
object. For example:
privateData = { 'ad-ctr': 0.0134,
'conversion-value': 12.50 }
Then, in the publisherResponse, the
publisherSignals object can be used to pass signals related to the page or ad slot:
publisherSignals = { 'ad-slot-ctr': 0.00597,
'page-categories': ['news', 'sports'] }
Both of these objects will be passed into the generate_bid()
function, where arbitrary logic can be used to combine these signals into a final bid price.
Inside the privateData
object, you can specify frequency parameters and/or a frequency cap:
privateData = { 'frequency_optimization': { 0: 1.0,
1: 0.9,
2: 0.6,
3: 0.4,
4: 0.1 },
'frequency_cap': 4 }
The browser supplies the frequency for the ad in browserSignals,
in the ad-day-frequency field:
browserSignals = { 'ad-day-frequency': 4 }
Then, the generate_bid() function can contain
logic like:
if browserSignals['ad-day-frequency'] >= privateData.frequency_cap:
return 0
else
bid *= privateData.frequency_optimization[browserSignals['ad-day-frequency']]
return bid
Inside the privateData
object, you can specify a list of sensitive categories for the advertiser:
privateData = { 'sensitive-categories': ['natural disasters', 'crime'] }
The publisher request may contain a list of categories:
{
'url': 'https://publisher.example/path/to/page',
'ad-slot-id': '1234',
'ad-sizes': ['320x480', '1024x768', '1920x1080'],
'restricted-categories': ['cat1', 'cat2'],
'floor-price': 0.75,
'metadata': {'page-categories': ['cats', 'dogs'],
'above-the-fold': true,
...
'published-date': '2020-09-19'}
}
The SSP is responsible for sending this to DSPs.
The DSP can unpack the page-categories and pack them into their publisherSignals object. Note that
on the DSP's server side, they may have additional metadata about this publisher and page and can add
whatever they see fit to their publisherSignals object. Perhaps this page is about cats, dogs, and
crime, but the publisher didn't declare the crime category. The DSP knows this and sends back:
publisherSignals = { 'page-categories': ['cats', 'dogs', 'crime'] }
From here, the generate_bid()
function can contain logic like:
for sensitive_category in privateData['sensitive-categories']:
if sensitive_category in publisherSignals['page-categories']:
return 0
In this section, we aim to address most of the issues raised in the in-browser-auction-publisher-issues repo. To that end, we follow the same outline as presented there.
Publishers need to be able to control which ads, including interest-group-based ads, appear on their web properties. Publishers want to control what content appears on their web property for multiple reasons:
- Ad quality/publisher-determined brand safety rules - there are many categories of content or specific advertising brands, categories of advertising brands, or specific ads that a given publisher would not want to appear on their site. (Related issue: Capabilities of the proposal for publishers · Issue #51 · WICG/turtledove)
During the creative review process, the ad categories are declared by both the DSP and the SSP. Using review tokens which include these categories in a signed hash, along with an SSP public key, the publisher can be assured through trust with the SSP that these categories are an honest declaration.
(Note that delayed-approval does not allow for an SSP to provide categories a priori. Necessarily, the SSP has a trusted relationship with the DSP to allow their ads through without an initial approval. However, once approval occurs, the SSP has an opportunity at this point to declare its categories.)
Then, during the publisher request, the publisher can declare its restricted categories:
{
'url': 'https://publisher.example/path/to/page',
'ad-slot-id': '1234',
...
'restricted-categories': ['cat1', 'cat2'],
...
}
This object goes to the SSP. Perhaps, if desired, the SSP can store the restricted categories
for the publisher server-side. Regardless, in the publisherResponse,
the SSP has an opportunity to filter out contextual ads that are not allowed to be shown on the page.
Logic can be as simple as:
for restricted_category in publisherRequest['restricted-categories']:
for dsp in publisherResponse['dsps']:
for ad in publisherResponse[dsp]['ads']:
if restricted_category in publisherResponse[dsp][ad]['categories']:
// remove ad object from publisherResponse
if restricted_category in publisherResponse[dsp][ad]['ssp-token']['categories']:
// remove ad object from publisherRespone
For interest-based ads, this filtering can be applied in the logic of the auction instead of on the SSP side.
If a DSP attempts to make false claims or mix-and-match tokens, its ads will simply not render if the browser also provides a verified content rendering scheme (see k. Verified content rendering).
As for specific advertisers or specific ads, this is even simpler (there's no SSP verification of ad content) and can also be applied in the logic of the auction:
function evaluate_auction(submittedAds, privateData) {
for ad in submittedAds:
if ad['advertiser'] in privateData['banned-advertisers]:
// remove ad object from submittedAds
if ad['ad-cbor-url'] in privateDAta['banned-ads']:
// remove ad objected from submittedAds
// rest of auction logic
}
Malvertising - Some ads may contain (or link to) malware. If this isn't detected prior to a bundle being delivered to the browser, publishers need a mechanism to block malware from being served to their sites' users and to take appropriate action against the source of the malware.
- In the event that a malvertising campaign is discovered, publishers require mechanisms to block an ad from appearing on their sites.
This can be accomplished as above by updating the privateData object passed into the evaluate_auction
function.
2. Publishers use third-party malvertising detection services to prevent malvertising from serving to their users.
Admittedly, TERN doesn't seem to allow for this. A third-party that has direct access to the ads displayed to the user, potentially coupled with a user ID, leaks cross-site tracking information.
3. In the event that an ad server or DSP is compromised and may have served malware, the blocking needs to apply to bundles that may already have been cached. This could involve the publisher or a third-party service.
This can also be accomplished with the same mechanism described above with the privateData object. In the
most egregious of circumstances, a publisher can even block an entire DSP from showing ads on their pages.
- Pausing advertising. - Marketers sometimes choose to rapidly pause their ads in all media after an adverse news event such as an airplane crash. Publishers of any web property on which the marketer's ad might appear will need to support this.
An advertiser can use the publisherSignals object in the publisherResponse
object to define a blocklist of campaigns:
publisherSignals = { 'stopped_campaigns': ['campaign123', 'campaign456'] }
The privateData
object can contain the campaign ID attached to the particular ad:
privateData = { 'campaign_id': 'campaign456' }
Then, the generate_bid() function can contain
logic like:
if adSignals.privateData.campaign_id in publisherSignals.stopped_campaigns:
return 0;
A publisher can incorporate similar mechanisms, but would instead use the privateData object
that is passed into the evaluate_auction() function.
- Publishers need to be able to fulfill directly sold ad placements. Many publishers often secure higher-revenue advertising based on the ability to deliver guaranteed impressions. Publishers need to balance short term optimization of revenue with longer-term strategic client relationships, which means serving lower priced ads ahead of higher priced ads in certain cases. Being able to control this without a time delay is critical to publishers meeting their contractual and strategic goals. Publishers can currently make direct and RTB work together using a variety of techniques.
The TERN auction logic allows the publisher to provide a script with arbitrary logic for selecting winning ads at whatever submitted price.
- The highest bid should not always win. Publishers need the flexibility to be able to optimize their revenue and strategic goals by controlling which ads are delivered for given placements, which rely on configurable rules that compare direct sold ads, and indirect sold ads, regardless of why the marketer wants to engage a particular end user (e.g., contextual or interest-based targeting) Example rules include only overriding a guaranteed placement if it is over a target bid. The target amount may change over time. Related issue: Publisher ad network control over ad eligibility and auction ranking · Issue #70 · WICG/turtledove
This is eminently doable in TERN. For example, logic like:
function evaluate_auction(submittedAds, privateData) {
indirect_winner = null
direct_winner = null
for ad in submittedAds:
if ad['deal-ids'] == [] and ad['bid'] > indirect_winner['bid']:
indirect_winner = ad
continue
if ad['deal-ids'] != [] and ad['bid'] > direct_winnder['bid']:
direct_winner = ad
continue
if indirect_winner['bid'] > privateData['indirect-threshold']:
winning_price = // calculate winning price here
return indirect_winner, winning_price
else:
return direct_winner, deal_price
}
Parameters such as privateData['indirect-threshold'] can be updated on a real-time basis, as the
publisher is responsible for supplying this object on every impression opportunity.
1. For example, the Google Ad Manager "dynamic allocation" feature (if a direct deal is pacing correctly, complete at original price, if pacing falls behind then increase bid CPM to win more often. If the direct deal is pacing ahead, then cut the bid)
This is dependent on some type of reporting mechanism that can provide this pacing data on a suitably
real-time basis. Such a mechanism is outside of the scope of TERN, but if such a service is available,
parameters to adjust a direct deal's bid CPM can be controlled again through the privateData object.
2. Direct deals that are pacing behind need to compete in the TURTLEDOVE auction at a higher effective price, and those that are pacing ahead need to compete at a lower price. The changes publishers make to rule sets must be immediately applied by TURTLEDOVE auctions.
This is similar to the above.
- Publishers need to set floor rates based on several criteria. (Related issue: Capabilities of the proposal for publishers · Issue #51 · WICG/turtledove)
- A publisher may not want an ad to serve at all, if it is below a minimum "floor" set for that page, section, or site.
Floors can be set in the privateData object and enforced in the auction logic,
which is a script that the publisher controls:
function evaluate_auction(submittedAds, privateData) {
for ad in submittedAds:
if ad['bid'] < privateData['floor-price']:
// remove ad from submittedAds
// rest of auction logic continues
}
A publisher may not want an ad from a certain brand, vertical or campaign unless it is above a minimum floor set for that brand, vertical, or campaign.
For example, a publisher may set a "floor for automotive"
Publishers choose to protect their direct sales business, by not allowing marketers to undercut their pricing via indirect sales channel on the open market.
This is also doable, but requires a more complex privateData object that contains a child object
which contains the category (or advertiser or vertical) floors:
function evaluate_auction(submittedAds, privateData) {
for ad in submittedAds:
for category in ad['categories']:
if ad['bid'] < privateData['category-floors'][category]:
// remove ad from submittedAds
// rest of auction logic continues
}
- Publishers need to honor contractual terms preventing competitors from appearing together. If the contextual system serves an ad for one brand in one slot on the page, the decision process in other ad slots needs to know not to serve direct competitor ads. The publisher needs to control which brands are considered competitors. (For example, Amazon.com might be blocked as a direct competitor of a local bookstore ad on a book review site, while an IT site might not block Amazon.com for competing with a database ad.)
Admittedly, TERN does not support this. Speculatively, it may be possible for the auction logic to run separate auctions with the context of the whole page and contain logic to adjudicate between competitor placements on the same page.
- The bid price set by the marketer is not necessarily the price at which it should compete in the auction. Publishers need to apply their own weighted prices, not necessarily the bid price. The "price" of a given ad is assigned by the buyer, but that price may not be what the publisher gets paid. In this case the publisher needs to apply an adjustment for auction purposes. Adjustment must be applied by the publisher in a 1st-party context. (Related issue: Ad Pricing · Issue #14 · WICG/turtledove)
The TERN auction logic provides a mechanism to do this. While the auction script is not fully specified here (yet), there isn't any particular reason it couldn't return an object such as:
{
'ad': ad-object,
'dsp-bid': 1.70,
'dsp-price': 1.65,
'ssp-bid': 1.80,
'ssp_price': 1.79
}
where these prices are derived within the auction logic itself. Further collaboration is almost certainly required to flesh this out.
- VAST errors: If a given ad is known to have VAST errors 20% of the time (e.g., does not serve) then it needs to have its bid price reduced by 20%, by the publisher.
In some ways, this may be related to the pacing mentioned in the publisher fulfillment
section. While out of scope, if there's an adequate real-time reporting mechanism for VAST errors,
the publisher can pull that report and apply bid adjustments through the privateData object in the
auction logic.
- Post-bid brand safety blocking: If a given buyer has brand-safety controls that prevent an ad from serving on a page, the publisher ultimately does not get paid. Publishers can currently adjust for this by reducing the effective bids for impressions from a given buyer (e.g., if some ads serve, but others do not).
In TERN, the advertiser is responsible for their own brand safety, and any ads would be removed before entering the auction.
- Reporting discrepancies: For many reasons, buyer and seller reporting (and third parties) does not match, and publishers need to be able to reduce (or increase) the bid price based on those discrepancies to ensure the ads compete at a price that is equal to what the publisher actually gets paid.
This is once again similar to the publisher fulfillment section. This is doable in TERN, but is contingent upon an adequate reporting mechanism, which is out of scope for this document.
Publishers need to comply with regulatory requirements.
For example, COPPA compliance in the US might forbid a certain interest-group ad from being served on a given page.
Even if machine learning can classify underage drinkers into a cohort with legal age drinkers, they still can't get alcohol ads. How would a site signal to the auction that this given user is not eligible for alcohol ads?
In TERN, we could make it so that COPPA compliance is a required field for the ad object. If a publisher
knows that a given user is underaged, it can declare this in the publisher request
so no contextual ads are returned by the SSP that would violate COPPA compliance. Similarly, this fact can
be passed in the publisherSignals object (as described in section 3b), which becomes an input
for the DSP's bidding function. Here, DSPs can opt to not bid for ads which are not
COPPA-compliant. Finally, the auction logic controlled by the publisher can remove ads from
the auction that are not COPPA-compliant as well. In short, TERN can provide a multi-layered protection scheme
for regulatory concerns provided we enforce the declaration within the ad objects themselves.
The following presents a series of possible platform features which could be combined to realize TERN's take on TURTLEDOVE. Some of these may already exist under different names or may be infeasible, and some things (e.g., fenced frames) may behave differently than anticipated here. The point is to prompt discussion around the minimum set of platform features which are desired vs what can actually be implemented.
Allow per-origin storage of objects associated with that origin (the owner).
Unlike localStorage, reads are only allowed for a subset of each object's properties, according
to some UA policy.
Also unlike localStorage, allow extensions to the UA policy to support direct reading of an
owner-specified subset of properties by a specific set of different reader origins (if they
have otherwise obtained a reference to the object).
Similar to Transferable in that an object could be shared without serializing a copy, but the UA itself remains the owner and each recipient of a reference can only view a subset of properties.
Locally store private interest-based advertisement data (objects) associated with some owner.
The data must have a specific form. It will not be accessible except indirectly through the other
new platform features described below.
It may be called in three contexts:
-
In a normal execution context on some
ownerorigin (e.g., as a result of an explicit action by an advertiser or DSP acting on its behalf). Theadsproperty is optional here, andgroupsis required. Acceptingadshere is a UA policy decision (e.g., if the owner is known to be privacy-respecting, W3C-compliant, etc). -
As a result of an automatic UA background task (described below) to fetch updated metadata associated with a previously-joined interest group. The
groupsproperty is optional here, andadsis required. -
In an
auction contextas a result of a call to an advertiser or DSP-providedupdate_interest_groups()function (call made by the UA as a result of a call torunDecisionLogic()with third parametertrue). Thegroupsproperty is required here, andadsis ignored or prohibited.
navigator.advertising.writeAdvertisementData(data)
-
datakey value type value meaning owner String owner's origin URL readers Map(String, Array(String)) specs for which readers can access which ad properties advertiser String URL of the actual advertiser groups Map(String, Number) interest group membership specs ads Array(Map(String, _)) ad specs relevant to groupsthird-parties Map(String, String) [TODO: specify] decision-logic-url String URL of owner's current decision logic for this advertiser An error will be signaled if
ownerdoes not match the executing origin.readershas this form:'readers': { 'https://ssp-1.example': ['field1', 'field2'], 'https://ssp-2.example': ['field2', 'field3'] }Each key specifies an origin which may read the properties given by the value in a cross-origin sharing context (for each advertisement object created or updated based on this call).
groupshas this form:'groups': { 'interest-group-1': ttl1, 'interest-group-2': ttl2 }Each such group name is associated with each advertisement derived from the provided
adsvalue. The UA itself can later look up all advertisements which were previously associated with each such group (described below).Each
ttlNis a Number representing the duration in seconds after which membership in the associated named group should cease.The UA should record the current time when the call is made so that this TTL (subject to some user-controlled maximum) can be applied and the recency signal can later be computed. If an advertisement is no longer associated with any live group mapping, it should be expunged by the UA.
decision-logic-urlis a URL referencing a script resource which defines agenerate_bid()function (and possibly anupdate_interest_groups()function) for use in later auctions pertaining to this(owner, advertiser)pair. The latest value overrides any prior values set for the same pair. Given an advertisement, the UA should be able to determine the correctdecision-logic-urlvalue to use (which may have been changed by a more recently-updated ad for the same advertiser).Each
adsitem is a semi-opaqueMapofStringkeys to values. A subset of those keys may be read by theowner, and in origins other than theownerbased on thereadersvalue (see next section).
None.
The call may silently fail if the user is unwilling to accept interest-based advertising for this owner/advertiser/etc, but these dispositions are reported via ARAPI and not to the caller.
writeAdvertisementData() throws an exception if the owner parameter is not equal to
self.origin. [TODO: remove the origin key and always associate data with current origin if no
security issues arise in doing so.]
It may also throw an exception if data is malformed.
Based on the writeAdvertisementData() call, an interest-based advertisement is a special
permissioned siloed shareable object which:
-
Has an identity defined by
(owner, advertiser, ad-cbor-url). -
By virtue of being a permissioned siloed shareable object, is permanently associated with an
ownerorigin. Updates occuring in that origin happen without restriction. Reads for a subset of properties may occur in the same or different origins according to thereadersproperty and the UA's policy for advertisement objects. The policy should deny reading of thegroupsproperty except by the UA itself in a special context, or byownerin theauction context's per-ownersandbox. -
Has
owner-provided metadata (name,formats, etc). -
Has an
owner-provided set of metadata field specs controlling what properties each reader may read in addition to the advertisement's identity. -
Is associated with one or more interest groups given in
groups. Each has a TTL. Only the UA may access this information. -
Is associated with some
decision-logic-urlspecifying a script resource which can be used inrunDecisionLogic(). These are namespaced at(owner, advertiser)level (latest update wins).
writeAdvertisementData() input:
{
'owner': 'https://dsp.example',
'advertiser': 'https://advertiser.example',
'readers': {'https://ssp-1.example': ['name', 'categories', 'ssp-1'],
'https://ssp-2.example': ['ssp-2'],
'https://ssp-3.example': ['categories']},
'groups': { 'interest-group-1': duration1,
'interest-group-2': duration2 },
'ads': [{'name': 'ad-123456789',
'formats': [{ 'aspect_ratio': '16:9',
'min_height': 400,
'max_height': 800 }],
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp.example/ads/ad-123456789.wbn',
'ssp-1': {'token' : 'review-token-12345',
'categories': ['ssp-cat1', 'ssp-cat2']},
'ssp-2': {'direct-deal-token': '...', ...},
'categories': ['cat1', 'cat2', 'cat3']},
{'name': 'ad-4321',
'ad-cbor-url': 'https://dsp.example/ads/ad-4321.wbn',
'categories': ['cat4']}],
...
}
Two ads now exist, owned by https://dsp.example:
(https://dsp.example, https://advertiser.example, https://dsp.example/ads/ad-123456789.wbn)(https://dsp.example, https://advertiser.example, https://dsp.example/ads/ad-4321.wbn)
The user is now in the interest-group-1 and interest-group-2 groups, and those groups are both
associated with (can be used to look up) these ads. Only the UA may perceive this mapping or
otherwise read the groups property.
Scripts executing in https://dsp.example may update metadata associated with these ads by making
writeAdvertisementData() calls, and may read the identity and any field other than groups.
They may read 'groups' in the special per-owner sandbox created as part of generating bids in
the auction context. [TODO: reconcile 'groups' reading with other conflicting statements about
that property.]
Scripts executing in https://ssp-1.example may read the following properties of each ad, if they
have otherwise obtained a reference to the ad:
- The identity tuple.
- The
ssp-1field. E.G., to allow this reader (an SSP) to later enforce creative validation/approval before display. - The
namefield. - The
categoriesfield.
Provide a facility which can be triggered in any origin for the purpose of obtaining relevant
interest-targeted advertisements. This call may only occur inside the special auction context
(described below).
navigator.advertising.matchingAdvertisements([owners])
-
ownersAn optional Array of String values. Each value denotes an
ownervalue appearing in a priorwriteAdvertisementData()call.
A
Promise
for a Map(String, [Object]).
If owners is empty or null, keys for all eligible owners are returned. Otherwise only the
provided owners are returned. In either case, to be eligible to appear in this result, an owner
must have previously declared the executing origin as a reader in a prior
writeAdvertisementData() call.
For each eligible owner, the UA associates under that owner key in this returned map a list of
advertisements (as permissioned siloed shareable objects) corresponding to the live interest groups
in which the user is a member.
The executing origin may access only the identity tuple associated with each object, plus any
properties declared by the owner as available for it to read (also subject to UA policy).
The UA may limit the number of items on a per-owner basis (and across owners) based on some UA policy.
Provide a facility which can be triggered in any origin for the purpose of generating bids for a
set of advertisements. This call may only occur inside the special auction context (described
below).
Bid generation will be achieved by executing an advertiser-provided script in a private sandbox
(one per owner or (owner, advertiser)). The only information which can escape is a bid price
(priority) for each provided advertisement, and each such value will be computed in isolation. UA
policy may limit the number of bids which are computed or returned.
Depending on the value of the third parameter, this may also result in the user joining additional interest groups as described below.
navigator.advertising.runDecisionLogic(advertisements, extraData, enableInterestGroupUpdates)
-
advertisementsAn Array of advertisements (or specs for them).
Each value will either be an object returned from
matchingAdvertisements()(an interest-targeted ad object), or aMap(String, _)(an ad spec such as from a contextual bid response) containing'advertiser'and'decision-logic-url'keys.Each value will become the first argument to the advertiser-provided bid generation function.
[TODO: group by
(owner, advertiser)and pass all at once in a single call to advertiser-provided bid generation function if no privacy violation could ensue.] -
extraDataAny value provided by the caller. It will become the second argument to the advertiser-provided bid generation function.
-
enableInterestGroupUpdatesOptional Boolean indicating whether the UA will call the advertiser-provided
update_interest_groupsfunction.
A Promise for an Array(Number) in the same order as the input. Each value can be used to
establish a priority ordering among the advertisements (e.g., a bid price), at least for a specific
owner or (owner, advertiser).
An entity deciding on a subset of ads to display can use these priority (bid) values to conduct an auction according to its own conventions.
The UA may return null as the value for a subset of result offsets according to some policy
(e.g., resource exhaustion, a desire to only return top N bids per (owner, advertiser) for
privacy reasons, etc).
Each value of the first argument will have been associated with some decision-logic-url. These
URLs define an advertiser (or DSP)-provided bidding function which produces a bid price for a
specific ad, given some context. (E.G., they will reference a script resource which defines a
toplevel function of three arguments when evaluated.)
For each decision-logic-url, the UA will create a sandboxed execution context with that origin
and obtain the toplevel generate_bid() function provided by the advertiser (or DSP). The most
recently provided value for each (owner, advertiser) is what should be used for each ad, and this
most-recent value should be computed by scanning the input before operating on it in case any
provided (contextual) ad specs define it. [TODO: consider siloing these most-recent-URL values by
ad type; otherwise, an SSP could possibly overwrite the value specified by the DSP with its
interest-targeted ads (by providing a new value with a contextual response ad here).]
Within each such execution context (with no memory between calls), the UA will call that
generate_bid function with the following arguments:
-
One of the items from the original
advertisementsparameter tonavigator.advertising.runDecisionLogic(). If the item is an interest-targeted advertisement (permissioned siloed shareable) object, and if the executing origin (specified bydecision-logic-url) is the same as the owner of the object, it can make full use of the object. Otherwise if the origin was declared as a reader by the owner, it can read the properties previously declared as readable by it. Otherwise it can't make use of the item (and shouldn't have received it as an argument).If the item is instead an ad spec (a map, e.g., from a contextual bid response), the
generate_bidfunction can always make full use of the item. -
The
extraDatavalue given as the second parameter tonavigator.advertising.runDecisionLogic(). This should contain any publisher-provided signals. In the case of a DSP+SSP, it should also contain thepublisherSignalswhich a DSP provided for its future use to the SSP in its contextual bid response, but there is no platform restriction on which bidding function receives which value here (or how they are sourced). This implies that for the DSP+SSP case, a separaterunDecisionLogiccall should be made for each DSP. -
A
browserSignalsobject containing UA-computed information like recency, frequency, group membership, etc. See 4. Browser Signals.
Within the scope of each generate_bid call, calls to writeAdvertisementData() are disallowed.
If enableInterestGroupUpdates is truthy, the UA will call the toplevel update_interest_groups
function provided in the same script as generate_bid and in the same type of isolated context.
Within the scope of that call, calls to writeAdvertisementData() are allowed (with the ads
property disallowed or ignored) and may result in adding (or removing) the user to interest groups.
The parameters to the call will be extraData (from the call to runDecisionLogic) and
browserSignals (same as above). The purpose of this mechanism is to allow advertisers/DSPs to
write interest groups as a result of new information obtained via contextual bid requests, yet also
allow publishers/SSPs to remain in control of whether this can occur. Each advertiser/DSP could
use its own convention here (e.g., pass a DSP-signed value via extraData in contextual response
and verify it here before acting on it).
Provide a facility which can be triggered in any origin for the purpose of activating the special
auction context sandbox / trap door.
navigator.advertising.activateSandbox(adSlots)
-
adSlotsAn
ArrayofMap(String, _)(orMap(String, Map(String, _))) ad slot specs describing the ad slots which are available to display ads. Each ad slot spec has the following keys:key value type value meaning id String the id of the element in window.parent.documentwhich will parent the rendered ad ifrender()is called for itformats Array(Map(String, _)) array of opaque format specifications for the ad slots (e.g., size, allowed types, etc)
None.
The sandbox permanently disables all network access and cross-context communication channels in the current execution context, but enables access to:
navigator.advertising.matchingAdvertisements()navigator.advertising.runDecisionLogic()navigator.advertising.render()navigator.advertising.adSlots(read-only property equal to the providedadSlotsparameter)
Subsequent render() calls will be allowed only targeting the ids which were passed into this
activation call.
It should be possible to embed a context (e.g., iframe) while granting it special permission to
later call render() with ids targeting DOM elements in the embedding context. And also to pass
information about each ad slot (either via attributes or postMessage) to that embedded context.
Provide a facility for advertiser (or SSP)-controlled rendering of ads without leaking user interest information from the private on-device auction.
navigator.advertising.render(id, bundleUrl, reportingData, extraData, contentHash)
-
idThe id of the DOM container element in
window.parent.documentwhich should be the parent of the rendered ad. -
bundleUrlThe URL (https://rs.http3.lol/index.php?q=aHR0cHM6Ly9naXRodWIuY29tL3BhdWxvLXRvc2hpby1vbHhici90dXJ0bGVkb3ZlL2Jsb2IvbWFpbi9lLmcuLCA8Y29kZT5hZC1jYm9yLXVybDwvY29kZT4gZnJvbSB0aGUgYWR2ZXJ0aXNlbWVudA) of a mostly-self-contained ad bundle which can be rendered in a fenced frame.
-
reportingDataAdditional info to associate with this ad rendering / being clicked / etc (in future related ARAPI submissions). For example, price to be paid. [TODO: specify format / give other examples.]
-
extraDataExtra data to provide for use in rendering the ad. This could be the original interest-targeted advertisement itself (a permissioned siloed shareable object subject to the same permission/use rules as in other contexts). See prior discussion of "Products" for a common use-case.
-
contentHashOptional specification of a content digest and size intended for use in advertising flows involving creative approval; UA will not render/activate if content does not match. See k. Verified content rendering.
A Promise for a Boolean indicating whether the render was successful. In case of failure, the
caller can try again with a different ad. (Or for example, wait for a period of time after
succeeding before rotating in a different ad.)
The UA should delete all children of the given id in window.parent.document and create a new
opaque fenced frame child element of it with attributes based on the supplied parameters. The
embedding context should only have the ability to detect presence, not content of this child
element. [TODO: this may also imply some CSS restrictions.]
Note: this call can be made either inside or outside of the auction context sandbox activated via
activateSandbox().
render() throws an exception if the provided id is not a container element in
window.parent.document, or if activateSandbox() was called in the current context without
having provided id as one of the allowed render targets.
The UA will periodically fetch ad web bundles for a subset of interest-targeted advertisements
which have been seen in previous writeAdvertisementData() calls. As long as this background
fetch occurs periodically, it may also defer fetching some ad bundles until render time.
Subject to privacy concerns like k-anonymity, the UA will periodically fetch/refresh from a
well-known owner-provided /fetch-ads endpoint information to be used in
writeAdvertisementData() update calls. E.G., given some interest groups set previously,
periodically fetching updated sets of ads+metadata for the groups in which the user is still a
member.
Subject to privacy concerns discussed elsewhere, the UA will periodically submit aggregate reports to some reporting service (as in ARAPI).
The UA should support verified rendering for certain content. For example, by annotating an
iframe (or fenced-iframe, etc) with certain attributes, it can refrain from
rendering/activating the iframe unless the content which would be rendered matches the declared
attributes.
The purpose of this scheme is to support optional end-to-end verification of ad creatives.
<fenced-iframe src="https://rs.http3.lol/index.php?q=aHR0cDovL2RzcC5leGFtcGxlL2Fkcy9hZC0xMjM0NTY3ODkud2Ju",
content-digest="md5:d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e",
content-size="262144"/>
- UA at some point fetches the mostly-self-contained web bundle
http://dsp.example/ads/ad-123456789.wbn. - UA computes the digest and size of that artifact.
- UA only renders and activates the content if the actual digest+length matched the declared values.